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ÖZET 
 Bu çalışma güncel Türk sinemasını inceleyerek milliyetçilik, 
cinsellik ve azınlılık kavramlarının kesişimini araştırmayı amaçlamaktadır.  
Bu doğrultuda, Eğreti Gelin ve Hacivat Karagöz Neden Öldürüldü? filmleri 
bu kesişimi tarif edebilmek adına kullanılmıştır.  İki film de farklı 
zamanlardaki azınlıkların yükselen yeni devlet düzeni içine alınmasını 
anlatmaktadır.  Hacivat Karagöz filminde Anadolu’nun İslamlaşması ile 
Şaman, Ortodoks ve Kadın azınlıkların yeni sistem içine alınışının hikayesi 
anlatılırken, Eğreti Gelin filmi buna benzer bir oluşumu erken Türk 
milliyetçiliği içinde anlatmaktadır.  Bu film, erkek, kadın ve sapkın 
kategorilerinin yeni düzen içinde nasıl yerleştiğini tasvir ederken, ayni 
zamanda bu düzene uymayan gayrimüslimlerin ve de cinsel birlikteliklerin 
de yeni düzen içinde yutuluşunu göstermektedir. 
ABSTRACT 
 This study aims at investigating the intersection of nationalism, 
sexuality and minority concepts.  In this respect, the study uses Eğreti Gelin 
and Hacivat Karagöz Neden Öldürüldü? films to depict this intersection. 
Both films describe the appropriation of minorities in different eras in newly 
rising state orders.  While Hacivat Karagöz film tells the story of 
appropriation of Shamans, Orthodox and Women in the new system, Eğreti 
Gelin film explains a similar incident within early Turkish nationalism.  
This film not only portrays the ways in which the categories of men, women 
and pervert are established within the new order, but also shows the gulping 
of non-Muslims and inappropriate sexualities in this system.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Nationalism is a frequently studied subject.  Yet, its study is limited 
to its ideological formations.  However, although nations emerge to 
guarantee equal citizenship to all, it is in fact coded as the domination of 
bureaucratic/military/bourgeois elite.  Thus, nation perpetuates the norms of 
this ruling class, including their sexuality.  In fact, nations are embedded 
within a broader gender matrix, where abnormality is subordinated.  Thus, 
heterosexual middle class men rule over the nation by diffusing its gender 
norms over the rest of the society.  Nevertheless, nationalism is a Western 
invention, which makes its sexuality also Western.  Discriminatory power is 
already invested in Western values.  Hence, its sexuality is exclusionary. 
 Nationalism as an ideology is an exclusionary one.  It is erected on 
maintaining male bourgeois order at the expense of what it is not.  
Consequently, women, non-reproductive sex like masturbation and 
homosexuality and religious minorities are threatening for the idea of the 
nation.  Nevertheless, nations need those Others as they construct their 
identities through what they are not.  Therefore, sexuality in nationalism is 
taming of these Others within the heteronormative order of the bourgeois 
men, while not completely annihilating them.  Sexual Others remain as a 
site of national perpetuation.  To make its analysis in non-Western nations is 
a complicated one as Western values of national sexuality cannot be fully 
extrapolated into non-European contexts. 
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 Turkish nationalism is the culmination of various ideological 
attempts in the Ottoman era.  In this process, the rising ruling elite’s sexual 
norms are dispersed into the Turkish nation.  Yet, it differs from its 
European model.  Although in many ways Turkish national sexuality 
mirrors the European form, Turkish nationalism differs mainly in its relation 
to religion, Islam.  To this end, studying contemporary Turkish cinema is an 
appropriate medium as it reflects the outward projections of the Turkish 
nation.  Eğreti Gelin (Borrowed Bride) and Hacivat Karagöz Neden 
Öldürüldü? (Why were Hacivat Karagöz Murdered?) are two films, 
depicting the Turkish nation’s story at the intersection of nationalism, 
sexuality and minorities. 
Turkish nation-state building process is the story of gender sacrifices 
of minorities to maintain the new form of patriarchy created.  To this end, 
non-Muslims, women and prostitutes are contained within the discourse as 
they provide services to perpetuate the heterosexual male domination of the 
nation.  Although referring to six centuries before the Turkish Republic was 
founded, Hacivat Karagöz shows the ways in which contemporary Turkish 
nation perceives the rising rule of Islam in order to sustain the newly formed 
state.  Similarly, Eğreti Gelin piece is also a story of nation-building, where 
the modern order of nationalism appropriates the Anatolian culture into its 
rule.  Islam is again an important factor, making the nationality of non-
Muslims questionable.  Both motion pictures illustrate the ways in which the 
minorities sacrifice their genders in order to preserve the new state rule. 
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Chapter 2: Nationalisms and Sexualities 
2-1 Current Literature on Nationalism (and Sexuality) 
In modern era, everyone has a nationality, as well as a gender; 
Anderson contemplated when forming his nationalism theory1.  However, 
gender has not really been included within the study of nationalism.  Ivette 
claims that gender is rarely taken into consideration in the studies of nation, 
nationalism and nationality2.  These theories dismiss the somatic problems 
like skin color and gender, and rather focus on history of ideas3.  Yet, 
nations act like gender as they define the Other4.  Scholars have been 
increasingly including gender in the theories of nationalism. 
Nelson, for instance, articulated that United States was built as a 
union of white men across the line of class conflict that constructed an 
impassible gender and race barrier5.  Following the same vein, Becki Rose 
observes that “nationalist projects have always involved process[es] 
whereby populations are divided into racialized, sexualized and gendered 
categories of belonging and otherness”6.  Similarly, Jacqueline Stevens 
                                                 
1 B. Anderson (1991). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. London: Verso, 5. 
2 V. Ivette (1998). Men, Women and the Construction of Nationhood. [Electronic Version] 
Feminist Collections, 19:2, 4. 
3 J. S. Alter (1994). Celibacy, Sexuality and the Transformation of Gender into Nationalism 
in North India. [Electronic Version] The Journal of Asian Studies, 53:1, 46. 
4 A. Parker, M. Russo, D. Sommer & P. Yaeger (1992).  Nationalism and Sexualities. New 
York, NY: Routledge, 8. 
5 E. Cheyfitz (2000). National Manhood: Capitalist Citizenship and Imagined Fraternity of 
White Men. [Electronic Version] American Literature, 72:1, 221. 
6 O. Howlett (2005). Sexuality and Nationalism: The Impact of Sexual Regimes on Gay and 
Lesbian Belongings. [Electronic Version] Ph.D. dissertation, Carleton University, Canada, 
34. 
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points out that state is not separate but embedded in sexual institutions7.  
Likewise, Connell contends that state is a part of gender system and 
therefore it is gendered8.  Nationalism is embedded in a greater system of 
discourses.  Drezgic remarks: 
“Population discourses; the dominant discourses on gender and 
gender relations; and nationalist discourses (about origin and 
development of nations, and about survival of and threat to the 
national ‘stock’) … emerge as not only mutually dependent, but 
actually, mutually constitutive.”9 
There have been contemplations about constructing these links10, like the 
work of Mosse, Nationalism and Sexuality.  However, before him, the well-
known theorist of nationalism, Benedict Anderson, was already hinting at 
the connections. 
“Nations inspire love and often self-sacrificing love” said 
Anderson11.  “The nation is always conceived of deep, horizontal 
comradeship.  Ultimately, it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the 
past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as 
willingly to die for such limited imaginings”12.  Nations are limited as they 
                                                 
7 B. S. Somerville (2005). Notes Toward a Queer History of Naturalization. [Electronic 
Version] American Quarterly, 57:3, 660. 
 
8 P. A. N. Frederick (2002). Sexing the nation: State regulation of prostitution and 
homosexuality in Britain and the Netherlands in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. [Electronic Version] Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, United States, 15. 
9 R. Drezgic (1985). (Re)Producing the Nation: The Politics of Reproduction in Serbia in 
the 1980s and 1990s. [Electronic Version] Ph.D. dissertation, University of Belgrade, 
Serbia, vi. 
10 Alter, 45. 
11 As quoted in Somerville, 659. 
12 Anderson, 7. 
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have defined populations and boundaries13.  Nations are imagined through 
the diffusive powers of mass media “because members of even the smallest 
nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even 
hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their 
communion”14.  Nations are also imagined because nationals need to relate 
to each other although they don’t interact.  Nations are deep, horizontal 
communities, while inequalities and differences prevail15.  For Anderson, 
“communities are to be distinguished not by their falsity/genuineness, but 
the style in which they are imagined”16.  Since nations involve imagining a 
community in a particular style; national identity and citizenship encompass 
discursive operations of identity productions17.  Hence, these discursive 
productions erase the differences to form deep and horizontal communities, 
through creating rigid categories of gender and sexuality.  In these 
operations, nations function like gender, to define each other on the basis of 
what they are not18.  In sexual terms, it is the world of the ‘Other’, that is 
deviant and non-reproductive, whereas ‘Us’ is the heteronormatives, defined 
by men. 
According to Iris Marion Young, “founded by men, the modern state 
and its public realm of citizenship paraded as universal values and norms 
that were derived from specifically masculine experience: militaristic norms 
of honor and homoerotic camaraderie; respectful competition and 
                                                 
13 Anderson, 7. 
14 Anderson, 6. 
15 Anderson, 7. 
16 Anderson, 6. 
17 Wray, 3. 
18 Anderson, 5-7. 
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bargaining among independent agents; discourses framed in unemotional 
tones of dispassionate reason”19.  To gain access to these fraternalistic 
notions of citizenry, appropriate sexual conduct is crucial20.  Yet, feminine 
components are also present in the comradeship of the nation.  Parker et al. 
record that passionate brotherhood is always accompanied by the 
“‘respectable’ ideally feminine Mother, who produces, secures and 
represents the nation”21.  Definition of women is a process that operates vis-
à-vis the conceptualizations about what men are.  Yet, these processes are 
not static to delineate national belongings, but rather an on-going process 
that can never be fulfilled22.  David Evan notes that the citizenship 
machinery makes various status shortcomings of some to qualify as less 
than full citizens23.  Thus, gender and nation are defined in performative 
terms, such that nationals pass as citizens with respects to their ability to 
perform the conventions of nationalism.  However, all this process is a 
Western project, requiring re-definitions when applied to other contexts. 
This project entails review of two contemporary Turkish films that 
depict state formation efforts of country’s nationalism, where outcast 
communities like non-Muslims and prostitutes have a distinctive role and 
function in realizing nationalist and sexual discourses.  Yet, to start the task, 
western notions of nationalism and sexuality should be revisited to be 
appropriated to the Turkish context. 
                                                 
19 Quoted in Wray, 4. 
20 Yom, 8. 
21 Bhaskaran, 6. 
22 Wray, iii. 
23 Wray, 4. 
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2-2 Western Nationalism and Sexuality 
Nationalism and nation-states have tendencies of inclusion and 
exclusion.  Maintaining its security and autonomy, nations justify the 
exclusion of a few for the unification of the remaining within the state.  In 
sexual terms, it maintains compulsory heterosexuality24.  Nation depends on 
a construct of ‘deviance’ to build its ‘seemingly immutable borders’25.  
Bringing back the process of othernization, the contours of ‘Us’ is defined 
in reference to productive heterosexuality, whereas the ‘Other’ is the 
‘deviant’, who is discriminated to have limited access to national resources.  
Stychin remarks: 
“Once sexual orientation is accepted as an illegitimate basis for 
discrimination and recognized as legal, political, and cultural identity 
worth of protection, then the definition of citizenship (and 
correspondingly the composition of the nation) broadens and 
depends along sexual lines”26. 
 Pryke identifies three interconnections between nationalism and 
sexuality: 
1. National sexual stereotypes are often linked with race and 
ethnicity.  They exhibit excess or absence of correct national 
sexuality. 
                                                 
24 Howlett, 112. 
25 J. L. Tvordi (2002). Deviant Bodies and the Reordering of Desire: Heterosexuality and 
Nation-Building in Early Modern England. [Electronic Version] Ph.D. dissertation, The 
University of Arizona, United States, 7. 
26 Quoted in Howlett, 3. 
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2. During national conflicts ‘sexual others’ are villainized to 
defend national culture and identities from immoral and 
unconventional sexual practices. 
3. It involves regulation of sexuality for the well-being of the 
individual and the nation by supporting acceptable sexual behavior27. 
These interconnections, according to Mosse, are formed with the rise of the 
bourgeoisie and spread of their moral values28. 
                                                 
27 Howlett, 33. 
28 Mosse, George, L. (1985). Nationalism and Sexuality: Middle-Class Morality and Sexual 
Norms in Modern Europe. Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press. 
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2-3 The Rise of the Bourgeoisie and Perpetuation of their Morals 
With the increasing power of the bourgeoisie in Europe, Mosse 
claims their mores started to define the conventions, which he calls as 
bourgeois respectability29.  It is defined against the lower class, involving 
sexual morality of rigid gender roles and ‘sexual behavior through which a 
national ideal is expressed’30.  In that respect, national identity is defined 
through the lens of rigid sexual morality31.  According to Mosse, 
respectability entails correct and decent manners and morals, as well as 
proper sexual attitudes, involving identification of manliness, role of the 
women, and the opposition of insiders and outsiders.  He further claims that 
their norms started to be dictated to rest of the society as they gained 
economical control.  To maintain perpetuation of this order, bourgeoisie 
controls sexuality through institutions32. 
 Sexual discourse is contained within the institutions of medicine, 
education and law through their normalization of man and criminalization of 
deviance33.  These institutions set the norm as the heterosexual bourgeois 
man.  Thus, they also create the deviant against it.  Manliness contrasts the 
categories of women and homosexual to claim for national resources.  
Bourgeois man emphasizes the strength of body and mind, not brute force 
because energies, especially sexual passion, need to be contained to be 
                                                 
29 Mosse, 1-3. 
30 Frederick, 1-2. 
31 Frederick, 1. 
32 Mosse, 10. 
33 Mosse, 10. 
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channeled for political power34.  In that respect, hyper-sexuality and non-
reproductive sexuality are sanctioned.  Furthermore, manliness also has a 
militaristic articulation. 
 Fraternity is crucial to protect the nation from outside forces35.  
Although manliness has a long history, manly ideals were crystallized with 
nationalism.  It stood for the nation’s spiritual and material vitality, and 
asked for the strength of body and mind, as well as self-control, making the 
cult of manliness as a ‘powerful and pervasive middle-class moral code’36.  
According to Hyam, manliness was associated with hard demeanor and 
cleanliness of body and mind, which in part explains the military’s 
occupation with soldiers’ body.  As men serve in the army, they become the 
literal representation of the nation’s readiness37.  Men serve in the army to 
protect the women as they are the heart of the motherland, where virtuous 
women live38.  Thus, nationalist construction of masculinity and femininity 
create a division of labor whereby women reproduce the nation physically, 
culturally and symbolically, while men protect the nation39.  Motherland is a 
feminine private country.  Hence, this explains the link between rise of the 
liberal state and the distinction among the public and the private spaces, 
where the latter is exclusively feminine, while man is the head of this 
private space- the household40. 
                                                 
34 Mosse, 11. 
35 Howlett, 20. 
36 Frederick, 170. 
37 ibid 
38 Yom, 34. 
39 Drezgic, 9. 
40 Frederick, 15-6. 
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Nationalism provided the framework to regulate sexuality.  Thus, 
nationalist discourse, in the name of its concern over the welfare of its 
citizens, occupied itself with the proper definition of gender roles and 
appropriate sexual behavior41.  On an important note, these definitions mark 
the European notions of nationalism and sexuality. 
2-4 European Notions of Nationalism and Sexuality 
European Heteronormativity is defined against the formulation of the 
deviant.  According to Foucault, Homosexual is a 19th century product, 
which before was grouped under the general category of sodomy, including 
all the sexual deviance, like non-reproductive sex.  However, its definition 
outside of this group makes the Homosexual a unique species42.  This way, 
it can be further articulated to define heterosexuality. 
Man cannot be homosexual.  Homosexual is perceived to lack the 
capacity to control his sexual energies.  This contrasts greatly with the 
bourgeois man43.  Homosexual needs to be exorcised, as he confuses the 
sexes.  Similarly, the masturbator is someone who cannot pass as a man 
because he is not using his resources, his sperms, wisely.  Thus, bourgeoisie 
abolishes non-reproductive sexuality through the institutions of medicine 
and law.  Doctors somatize these sexualities as they define physical features 
of homosexuals and masturbators being amorphous and grotesque, 
                                                 
41 Frederick, 16. 
42 Tvordi, 11. 
43 Mosse, 25. 
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contrasting with Greek male beauty of proportionate and harmonious 
body44.  Abolishment was not only limited to sexual deviants. 
Like the homosexuals, racial deviance is sanctioned.  With the 
invention of race, certain groups in the urban metropolises were defined as 
‘dangerous classes’, like the Irish, and the Jew45.  Racial minorities are 
perceived to be less manly.  In Germany, Jews fulfilled this function46.  
Similarly, in the film Borrowed Bride, Tavit has a similar role, as Armenian 
Turks are pushed to the periphery in the nationalist discourse.  Women also, 
as being the opposite of men, define manliness through women’s deviance. 
Women function as contrasting category with respects to men, as 
they provide services of chastity and modesty47.  They dedicate themselves 
to the well-being and preservation of the normal for the society by securing 
male-male arrangements48.  Mosse points to three examples of Britannia, 
Marianne and Germania for Britain, France and Germany, respectively to 
illustrate his case49.  Among his illustrations, the case of Queen Luise of 
Prussia is telling for the Turkish case, as it parallels with Iffet Hanim, Ali’s 
mother.  For the German case, Queen Luise of Prussia served as the image 
of ideal woman as she preserved traditional values, but was very careful in 
not trespassing into the men’s world, further defining the division between 
two genders.  Women preserve traditional values in the active world of men 
                                                 
44 Mosse, 50. 
45 Frederick, 167-8. 
46 Mosse, 146-7. 
47 Mosse, 90. 
48 Mosse, 90-7. 
49 Mosee, 90. 
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because they are not corrupted50.  However, they are politically active as 
they instill manliness to their sons.  Still, women are deviant and must be 
avoided at all costs.  They contaminate men, who would otherwise live both 
sexually and spiritually upright Christian lives51.  Historicizing this and 
similar notions about women’s suppression would help to define the 
constructivist nature of these concepts.  Feminist theory reflects on it from a 
different angle. 
There is no transhistorical ‘nation’ or ‘patriarchy’, but feminist 
scholars agree that the nationalist discourses subjugate women as M/Other.  
Due to Father’s order, women’s role as citizens is reduced to Mother.  
Reformulating Adrienne Rich’s affirmation that “a women’s body is the 
terrain upon which patriarchy is erected”, national formation discursively 
constructs woman “as a symbol of national terrain upon which patriarchal 
political power is erected for the sake of ‘fathering’ the land and future 
generation of citizens”52.  Similarly, Yuval Davis claims that women are 
contained as Mothers within the nation, controlled by the institutions and 
discourses of the nation53.  However, prostitutes do not fall under this 
categorization, although they are women.  The other Other women, the 
prostitutes are demonized as the enemy of the nation54.  Thus, further 
exploration on heterosexuality is necessary. 
                                                 
50 Mosse, 97. 
51 Tvordi, 154. 
52 M. A. Carsillo (2003). Missionary Positions: Unpinning Women from Under the 
Paradigms of Patriarchal Discourses of Nation. [Electronic Version] Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of California, Irvine, United States, 3. 
53 Crasillo, 35-6. 
54 Yom, 28. 
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Heterosexuality is not necessarily the desire for the opposite sex.  If 
that was the case, prostitution would have not been as controversial as it is.  
It is, rather, man’s desire for political and religious domination, which 
sacrifices the women55.  When this concept is extrapolated to 
homosexuality, it seems that homosexuality poses a great threat to the 
foundation of nation and nationalism- heterosexuality as a political power of 
control.  Nation is built upon the capitalist family.  Therefore, 
homosexuality shakes the foundations of the heterosexist construct of the 
nation, the family56 
Marriage and traditional family are crucial building blocks of 
nations, letting them reproduce themselves.  Through these institutions and 
incentives, sexual regimes encourage citizens to procreate.  At this point, 
women’s reproductive capacity is emphasized for the reproductive needs of 
the nation.  These institutions marginalize alternative sexualities to keep 
compulsory heterosexuality intact57.  Marriage and motherhood can only 
exist within this framework of heterosexual matrix58. 
 According to M. Jacqui Alexander, the nation has always been 
within the heterosexual matrix as biology and reproduction have been at the 
heart of the nations.  That is why women’s sexual agency poses a threat to 
the foundation of the nation.  Sexually autonomous women pose a threat to 
the nuclear family, through which the fiction that the family is the 
cornerstone of a nation perpetuates.  Thus, erotic autonomy signals a danger 
                                                 
55 Tvordi, 140-1. 
56 Howlett, 35; Frederick, 2. 
57 Howlett, 112. 
58 Bhaskaran, 3. 
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to the heterosexual family and the nation.  Because loyal citizenship is 
colonized within the heterosexual reproduction, erotic autonomy brings with 
it the possibility of undoing the nation, a possible charge of no citizenship59. 
 To sum up, Yuval Davis argues that women represent the future of 
the nation because of their reproductive capacity; such that they need to be 
protected by men.  Thus, nationalism, centered on the family, creates 
hostility towards non-reproductive sexualities, like prostitution, 
homosexuality and masturbation.  The prostitutes are not chaste and 
motherly women, as they tempt the chastity of men, while the homosexuals 
are not men enough to ensure the nation and the empire’s preeminence60.  
Thus, sexuality is contained within a nationalist discourse. 
According to Foucault, a regime of power-knowledge-pleasure 
sustained the discourses in the West and the preoccupation with sexuality 
coincided with the rise of the nation-state.  It may be because population 
became an important political and economical agent, so was sex61.  ‘The 
truth’, in this articulation, has the power, where the truth about sexuality and 
biology, according to Rich, creates heterosexuality and motherhood as 
Nature, a nature that is not open to question62.  In ‘the production of truth’ 
certain institutions like military, church, medicine and the state are more 
privileged63.  Thus, bourgeoisie sustained its control over ‘the truth’ through 
an alliance of medical and legal registers. 
                                                 
59 Bhaskaran, 7. 
60 Frederick, 180. 
61 Frederick, 14. 
62 Crasillo, 37; Frederick, 39. 
63 Frederick, 39. 
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Medicine stigmatizes the deviants- women64, homosexuals and 
masturbators.  The medico-legal apparatus of the state, according to 
Connell, “criminalizes stigmatized sexual activity, embodies masculinized 
hierarchy, and organizes collective violence in policing, prison and war”65.  
Jeffrey Weeks attributes the rise of repressive laws regarding sex to the 
industrial capitalism and urbanization: 
“The late nineteenth century sees a deepening hostility towards 
homosexual, alongside the emergence of new definitions of 
homosexuality and the homosexual.  I believe these developments 
can only be understood as part of the restructuring of the family and 
sexual relations consequent upon the triumph of urbanization and 
industrial capitalism.  The result of these changes was the emergence 
in a recognizably modern form of concepts and meanings which are 
now common places of public discussion: for example, the notion of 
‘the housewife,’ ‘the prostitute,’ ‘the child’ and the concept of ‘the 
homosexual’ … as social norms became more clearly defined … so 
the condemnation of male homosexuality increased … This is 
clearly seen in the developments of sharper legal penalties in the last 
decades of the nineteenth century …” 66 
Along similar veins, Tilly accounts for state’s preoccupation with 
sexuality to the nationalization of military.  State was responsible for the 
health and education of the young males of the nation.  This way, military 
                                                 
64 Yom, 14. 
65 Quoted in Frederick, 15. 
66 Quoted in Frederick, 19. 
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entered to the sexual lives of the citizens67.  Nevertheless, Western sexuality 
sought for ways to find libertarian platforms.  
Mosse argues that middle-class respectability did not favor naturism 
and pornography68, and ‘all the printed material that could produce an erotic 
effect’69.  However, ‘Oriental Sex’ provided an outlet. 
According to Foucault, Western sexuality opposed to Ars Erotica of 
China, Japan and India.  However, it provided a libertarian discourse for the 
Victorian sexuality.  Along the same lines, Edward Said recorded that 
‘Oriental Sex’ after 1800 became an obsession for the European travelers 
and they had to refer to it all the time70.  Moreover, notions of sodomy, 
especially in England extended to Africa, North America and the East.  This 
way English not only constructed itself as normative spiritually, but also 
sexually71.  Through such operations, Western bodies were configured in 
opposition to the Eastern. 
                                                 
67 Frederick, 14-5. 
68 Mosse, 7. 
69 Quoted in M. Jefferies (2006). ‘For a Genuine and Nobel Nakedness?’ German Naturism 
in the Third Reich. [Electronic Version] German History, 24:1, 63-4. 
70 J. Puri, (2002). Concerning Kamasutras: Challenging Narratives of History and 
Sexuality. [Electronic Version] Signs, 27:3, 613. 
71 Tvordi, 22. 
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2-5 Non-Western Nationalism and Sexuality 
Eastern nationalism is an interesting dualism because nationalism 
itself is a Western concept.  According to Chatterjee, Eastern nationalism 
seeks a balance between French and German models of nationalisms72.  
French model emphasizes Enlightenment ideas, universality and individual 
liberty73.  On the other hand, according to Mosse, Germany developed a 
distinction between culture and civilization, which led to their acceptance of 
culture and the rejection of civilization74. 
 Eastern nationalism, continues Chatterjee, both imitates and is 
hostile to the model it imitates.  It imitates the alien culture to accept its 
standards.  It also rejects traditional ways those were obstacles to progress, 
but perceived as marks of identity.  Therefore, Eastern nationalism tries to 
transform the nation culturally, while retaining its distinctiveness75. 
 Similarly, Radhakrishnan argues that the subject positions in these 
settings struggle two spaces; one internalizing the Western epistemological 
modes of pragmatic purposes and the other maintaining a true self, a 
culturally authentic one, that is uninfluenced by outside76.  In this context, 
women’s subject position is similar to that of Western women’s.  Women 
are expected to part alongside with men in nationalism as the preservers of 
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‘ahistorical inner domain’77.  Like this parallel, the case of Indian 
nationalism draws similarities in terms of abstaining from sex. 
 Gandhi’s sexual control is an important block in Indian nationalism.  
His control is linked to the notions of Hindu celibacy.  Celibate body is 
regarded as supremely fit to maintain national integrity.  Similarly, the 
semen retention of the Brahmacharya (Indian wrestler) is a sign of control 
over his body with rigid diet, exercise and rest.  He would radiate an ‘aura 
of vitality and strength’.  Someone with semen loss, on the other hand, will 
have an ugly look78.  These two examples, Gandhi’s celibacy, and 
Brahmacharya’s semen control and his fit appearance parallel bourgeois 
respectability. 
 On a note similar to Radhakrishnan’s observation, Indian 
nationalism also seeks a balance between British material world and the 
Indian Hindu value interior world79.  This case is telling for the Turkish 
case.  Official Republican ideology stated that a patriotic Turk should seek 
to balance the West and the East: science and technology, and spirituality80. 
In this context, sexuality and the deviants are defined mainly in 
reference to Islam.  Women’s sexuality and desire within the heterosexual 
conjugal arrangements was acknowledged along with men’s sexuality81.  By 
reference to Islam, as illustrated in Borrowed Bride, non-Muslims are 
                                                 
77 Sayigh, 167. 
78 Alter, 53. 
79 Alter, 46. 
80 Kadioglu, 177-8. 
81 P. Ikkaracan (2004). Women and Sexuality in Muslim Societies. [Electronic Version] 
Resources for Feminist Research, 31:1/2, 58. 
 
20 
pushed out of the nationalist discourse to the periphery, where they could 
have non-aligned sexualities.  Turkish nationalism interacts with these and 
many other factors. 
Turkish nationalism in so many ways was articulated in reference to 
Ottoman history.  Broadly speaking, Turkish nationalism is the end product 
of various consecutive failures of ideological attempts of Ottomanism, Pan-
Islamism, Pan-Turanism and Pan-Turkism.  At this point, it is important to 
iterate the Ottoman conjecture in late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
The empire had a very cosmopolitan structure in terms of religion 
and ethnicity.  In 1870s and 1880s, 40% of the population was made up of 
non-Muslim millets of Jews, Greek Orthodox (Bulgarian, Serbian and 
Greek) and Gregorian Armenians, while Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Circassians 
and Albanians accounted for the Muslim population82.  Thus, identity has an 
important function for the Ottoman context. 
In this multicultural environment, place of origin and religion 
determined the identity for the Ottoman subjects.  This aspect also had 
organizational ramifications for the Ottoman subjects.  Jews, Greek 
Orthodox and Armenians had their administrative systems and codes.  
Therefore, there was not a single citizenship to unite them all83.  Yet, with 
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the Tanzimat Reforms, Ottoman state changed its attitude towards the non-
Muslim subjects. 
Tanzimat Reformers secularized state’s treatment of its non-Muslim 
population with the 1839 imperial edict, the 1840 new penal code, and 
another imperial edict of the 1856.  These reform efforts aimed to create 
equality for all the Ottoman subjects84.  On top of that, with the fear of 
rising ethnic nationalism, the leadership of the time started to experiment 
with new ideologies. 
Tanzimat Reformers and Young Ottomans were interested in the 
idea of Ottomanism to unite all subjects of the empire under the banner of 
Ottoman.  However, it had a Western tone, privileging non-Muslim subjects 
and alienating the Muslims.  Consequently, after Ottomanism, Abdulhamid 
II tried to emphasize Islam with Pan-Islamism.  It was a form of proto-
nationalism that the sultan wanted to use against the rising challenge of 
Young Ottomans.  He was aware that with the constitutionalist efforts, 
Young Ottomans appealed to the educated populace.  Thus, Abdulhamid II 
tailored his message for the lower-class population, in the form of ‘folk 
Islam’ to unite all the Muslim subjects of the Empire85.  With the 1877-88 
Russo-Turkish War, great deal of Christian territories was lost and large 
quantities of Muslim refugees migrated to the Ottoman lands.  Within this 
context, Abdulhamid tried to unify the Muslim subjects with the pan-
Islamism project86.  As the sultan emphasized the religiosity of his 
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nationalistic efforts, Young Ottomans tried to fine tune different attributes in 
the face of rising ethnic nationalism in Europe. 
Eastern nationalism, as it is stated above, strives to find a balance 
between the indigenous characteristics of the populace and Westernism.  To 
re-emphasize, Indian nationalism, according to Radhakrishnan, sought a 
balance between British materialism and Indian Hindu values87.  Similarly, 
Young Ottomans tried to cope between Westernism and traditional Islamic 
values88.  Young Ottomans tried to resolve materiality of the West and the 
spirituality of the East, to portray compatibility of modernization and 
Islam89.  By this time, the nationalist ideology was gaining more of an 
ethnic tone.  The writings of Namik Kemal illustrate the shift from a 
cosmopolitan ideology to a more ethnocentric one. 
Change of viewpoint in Namik Kemal’s works is telling.  His earlier 
works emphasized all-inclusive concepts of fatherland and freedom for all 
Muslim ummet and non-Muslim millets.  However, with Slavic and 
Hellenic irredentism, the focus of his works shifted to the Turkish language 
and Turkish history as the unifying agent of all Muslims of the Empire90.  
This change in attitude can be attributed to the disaster of World War 1 and 
separation of Arab territories91.  Through time, nationalisms in the Ottoman 
Empire changed its focus. 
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As Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism failed, they gave emergence to 
new ideological trials.  The focus shifted from Pan-Turanism to Pan-
Turkism to finally Turkish nationalism.  Although it molded into an 
ethnocentric form, Islam still had a very prevalent influence.  Islam was a 
unifying agent as Turkism provided the framework.92.  Islam was the 
unifying agent, and the official monolithic absolute Turkish identity 
suppressed or ignored multiple identities at the periphery93.  This attribute 
makes citizenry of non-Muslims problematic. 
For the Turkism idea, Along with Namik Kemal, Ziya Gokalp’s 
works are credited as inspiration for Turkish nationalists.  Ziya Gokalp had 
been a very influential figure for the Young Ottomans and Kemalists as he 
attempted a synthesis of European elements with Ottoman Muslim 
civilizations94.  He believed in putting sociology into the service of 
investigating the reasons why Turkish nation lacked to be a modern nation.  
He diagnosed it to be the dichotomous representation of the East and the 
West, as he tried to reconcile the two with his attempts in adjusting culture 
and civilization95.  According to Gokalp, social unit of nation was the source 
of culture within the boundaries of civilization.  This view created a 
paradoxical synthesis of cosmopolitan French and anti-Western, anti-
Enlightenment German nationalisms.  Therefore, the new cadre of 
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intellectuals was invested by the duty of transforming the popular psyche by 
an elitist project from above96. 
Ziya Gokalp differentiated between culture and civilization.  He 
asserted that while the local culture had elements of Islam, the road to 
modernity passed through the appropriation of European civilization.  Thus, 
the real challenge appeared to be adoption of this civilizational mode while 
preserving the culture’s Turkish and Muslim national character.  It was a 
‘reconciliation of national-Islamic pride with European civilization’97.  
Gokalp’s attempt can be characterized as Turkiyecilik, Turkey-based-
nationalism, where he combined Turkish nationalism, Islamic beliefs and 
Western civilization98.  Islam belonged to national culture, while 
Westernization was a matter of civilization99. 
These discourses were pre-conditioned by various other historical 
events.  The collapse of Ottomanism with Greek, Serbian, Armenian and 
Arab nationalist agendas made it apparent that the Turkish core within the 
Ottoman society did not have another alternative but to construct its own 
nationalism100. 
By the end of World War 1, Ottomanist, Islamist and Pan-Turkist 
dreams came to an end.  Young Turks legitimized the rule of the nationalist 
and secularist elites.  The military members of this class were eager to 
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establish a secular nation-state101.  Therefore, Kemalist secularization is a 
result of a trend that started with Tanzimat and culminated with the Young 
Turks ideology102. 
With the victory of Independence War, Turkish military took over 
the command of the country.  The military controlled in the name of 
modernization, to change the society into a nation with stress on 
secularization103.  Along with this vein, Ataturk regarded Islam to be 
incompatible with nationalism and tried to strike it out from the nationalist 
discourse104.  However, Islam was maintained as an important feature in the 
lives of the Turkish nationals. 
 Turkish Republic inherited the Ottoman legacy of state control of 
religion.  In line with the Ottoman raison d’état of hegemony over religion, 
modern Turkish state did not separate religion from state completely.  
Rather, it was incorporated into the state bureaucracy and religious 
establishments105.  Turkish nationalism emphasized a form of secularism, 
where the state had an active role in shaping the religion.  This feature is 
manifested in the control of religion through Directorates of Religion 
Affairs and Pious Foundations106.  Similarly, religion courses represented a 
Republicanized-Islam or a nationalized Islam, which supported the 
separation of state and mosque107.  Therefore, Turks and Turkish nation 
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were Muslim, implying that a Turk is a Muslim while a Muslim is not 
necessarily a Turk108.  Within this context, main responsibility of a Muslim 
was to become a model citizen109. 
In most nation-state building processes, nationalism of minorities 
was problematic.  When transforming a multicultural empire to a nation-
state, ethnic and religious minorities faced great challenges in adapting to 
the cultural homogenization of the center110.  For the non-Muslims of the 
modern Turkish state, nationalism also had similar ramifications. 
 Non-Muslims in Turkey face various difficulties within the 
nationalist discourse.  Ethnicity related minority rights were perceived to be 
as betrayal to the indivisibility of the nation and the state111.  Non-Muslims 
were Turkish citizens, but since they were not from the Turkish-Muslim 
ethnie of the Ottoman Empire, they were not incorporated completely112.  
Behind the civic façade of the Turkish nationalism, religion determined the 
level of Turkishness.  Turkish nationalism lacked the cosmopolitan 
tolerance of Ottoman Empire.  Secular Turkish Republic perceived all 
Muslim ethnic communities as members of the Turkish millet, while 
discriminating against non-Muslim minorities113. 
 Taspinar lists several examples of the discriminatory attitude of the 
state against the non-Muslims minorities.  In the early years of the Republic, 
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Christian and Jewish subjects were excluded from military schools and 
academies.  In 1939, with the break of World War 2, all Armenian, Greek 
and Jewish males between the ages of 18 and 45 were mobilized to the 
camps in Anatolia.  1942 Wealth Tax was almost exclusively levied on non-
Muslims114. 
 Turkish Jews had a different position compared to the Armenian and 
Greek Turks.  Turkish nationalism formed anti-Armenian and anti-Greek 
sentiments, while staying neutral to the Jews.  Jews were loyal millet.  
However, as they gained economic wealth, anti-Semitism emerged on the 
grounds that Turkish Jews did not speak Turkish but Judeo-Spanish and 
French 115. 
Turkish nation is perceived to be as a military nation.  Every male 
Turk is born as a soldier.  Military is one of the main institutions where 
masculinity is reinforced.  Various sites of military define the experiences 
and identities of men and women.  Limiting military service to only men is 
‘a major source of gender difference that was defined and administered by 
the state’116.  Military service is a criterion to judge manhood.  It is both the 
matter of serving the nation and proving manliness.  Therefore, military 
service marks the difference between men and women117.  However, women 
are also invested with militaristic duties. 
 Women’s military service did not come from serving in the army of 
military, but in the army of educators.  Being educators was the military 
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service for the women118.  Education and educators have nationalizing and 
militarizing roles, where school functions in parallels to the army.  Arif 
Dirlik claims that education serves as an extension of military.  “Just as 
army is a school, so is the school an army”119.  Ataturk refers to army as ‘a 
great national school of discipline’120.  As military service is universal and 
compulsory, so is education121.  Following the same vein of argument, 
soldiers are the most fit citizens of the population as primary school 
education wanted to produce a fit body and a fit mind for strong, healthy 
and enlightened generations122.  Through creation of a militaristic education 
system, women served their military service as educators.  The Ministry of 
Education also created women through some other operations. 
 The Ministry of Education album of From the Ottoman Empire to 
the Republic of Turkey – How was it?  How has it Become? (Osmanli 
Imparatorlugu’ndan Turkiye Cumhuriyeti’ne – Nasildi? Nasil Oldu?) is an 
illustration for the discursive construction of woman identity in the early 
years of the nation-state.  This is album was created to celebrate the 10th 
year anniversary of the Republic, contrasting backward Ottoman Empire 
with the glorious Turkish Republic.  Generally speaking, the work points 
out that in during the Ottoman times, women were kept ignorant whereas in 
modern Turkey, they are active participants of their society123. 
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 The conventional mode of Eastern nationalism, that is balancing the 
West and the East, had been imprinted on the Turkish psyche, where women 
have an important process.  Women of the Turkish Republic are expected to 
look modern while retaining their traditional virtues like modesty; such that 
they would not step into the realm of men.  If this balance is not preserved, 
they are tagged as either loose or out-dated124.  Mosse’s illustration for the 
case of Queen Luise of Prussia, as debated above, parallels this observation.  
In that sense, nationalism, either Western or Eastern, is an extrapolation of 
the division between men and women into the nation-state mode, where 
women are modernized at the expense of preserving their position vis-à-vis 
the men.  Along with women, minorities are challenged with nationalism. 
The militarist component of Turkish nationalism serves a challenge 
for the minorities.  The discourse in the army assumes that all soldiers are 
Muslims as non-Muslims are perceived to be potential threat, then Turkish 
citizens125.  According to Corrigan and Sayer, official discourse suppresses 
differences in its nationalistic project.  However, not all differences are 
equally threatening126.  Armenian and Greek Turks face more prejudice, 
compared to Jews, as they had been viewed negatively because of their 
atrocities in the Ottoman Empire and during War of Independence127.  The 
case of ‘internal Other’ as an agent to unify suitable citizens within a nation 
can apply for the Turkish case128.  Therefore, the sexual colonization of 
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minorities internally can extend to the non-Muslims of Turkish Republic in 
their non-normative sexuality. 
31 
Chapter 3: Studying Film 
Kracauer, in his analysis of German cinema history, states that “film, 
whether fictional or documentary, can reveal the ‘outward projects’ of a 
people and represent a ‘collective mentality’ that can reveal the hidden 
‘psychological dispositions’ responsible for a nation’s conduct”129.  This is 
where the films of Hacivat Karagöz and Borrowed Bride come into play to 
describe the discursive formulation of minority sexualities.  Furthermore, 
these films come around at a time when the notions of modernism and its 
project, the nation, are facing challenges. 
The two films, Hacivat Karagöz and Borrowed Bride depict a 
postmodern look at the relationship between sexuality and the nation.  Atif 
Yilmaz inherently and Ezel Akay consciously provide the audience with a 
critique of modern identities, in this case national identities, at a postmodern 
era when all the identities are dead.  In that sense, these two films portray a 
deconstruction for the national sexuality. 
3-1 Murdering Hacivat and Karagöz: Islam’s Role in Ottoman State 
Formation 
“You betrayed my mother, her faith, the sisterhood and everything.  
And to whom?  Why?  I’ll tell you why: Because you converted only for the 
Ottoman power” exclaimed Ayse Hatun to his father, Kosem Mihal130.  
Why were Hacivat Karagöz murdered? (Hacivat Karagöz Neden Öldürüldü? 
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– Hacivat Karagöz) is a contemporary illustration of the tensions involved in 
state building processes of the newly forming Ottoman state.  As these two 
characters of Hacivat and Karagöz were traditional shadow puppets, their 
filmic story in the age of emerging Ottoman rule informs the spectators 
about the conjecture of the era.  It might be argued that studying a filmic 
depiction of early Ottoman history to understand modern nationalism is 
anachronism.  Although Ottoman state formation cannot be fully compared 
to modern notions of Turkish Republican Nationalism, Hacivat Karagöz 
serves a modern day projection of Turkish society’s imagining of Ottoman 
Empire through the lens of modern nationalism.  Furthermore, it is a case 
study to portray the ways in which Turkish nationalism is informed by the 
Ottoman state’s legacy, particularly on the role of Islam.  As Islam provided 
the unifying element for Turkish nationalism to be articulated131, similarly, 
Islam also had an important function in conceiving the Ottoman state.  
Therefore, studying Hacivat Karagöz through the lens of modern 
nationalism is not anachronistic.  Rather, the study allows to investigate the 
ways in which contemporary Turkish nation extrapolates its codes for 
nationalism to a different setting.  To reiterate Yom’s point, cinema is an 
outward projection of a society’s collective psyche responsible for a nation’s 
conduct132. 
 Hacivat Karagöz depicts the state formation processes of the 
Ottoman Fiefdom into an empire.  Set in 1330 in Bursa, Hacivat, an envoy 
for Esrefoglu Fiefdom, meets with Karagöz, nomadic, Shaman Turkomen.  
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They entertain the public as they work for the construction of the new 
mosque in the city.  As their fame gets bigger, royal family turns their 
attention to these two characters.  Meanwhile, the Ottoman ruling family in 
Bursa is busy configuring a way to reconcile Greek Orthodoxy within an 
Islamic rule. 
3-1-1 Confrontation of Islam, Orthodoxy and Shamanism 
Islam, as manifested in Hacivat Karagöz, had pre-conditioning 
effects on the future of Turkish nationalism.  It served as an agent to put in 
place the bourgeois respectability notions of ideals of men, and images of 
women.  Thus, the film illustrates the tensions between the Greek 
Orthodoxy’s treatment of sexes and Turco-Islamic interpretation of men and 
women in the functioning of state.  It is a story of sacrifices of women, 
Orthodoxy and Shaman religion in the service of building the Ottoman rule. 
 The film depicts the tensions involved among Islam, Orthodoxy and 
Shaman in the Islamization of Anatolia.  The scene for competition between 
Orthodoxy and Islam in gaining recruits illustrates the tensions involved in 
this period.  While lining up in front of a mosque, to be converted to Islam, 
Karagöz is tried to be recruited by the Orthodox priest.  The priest tries to 
convert the Shaman into Orthodoxy, and says “Are you changing your 
religion?  What’s the hurry?  Why would you change your religion? ... Your 
[Shamanistic] religion does not count.  Let’s make you an Orthodox.  What 
do you say?133  As the imam notices the priest’s move, he furiously 
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intervenes to keep him away from the ‘ignorant Turkomen’134.  The film is 
full of similar depictions of this process. 
Tatars’ and Greek rulers’ conversion into Islam is also telling.  Tatar, 
a non-Muslim state, converts into Islam to claim legitimacy in the region.  
Eredna, through conversion into Islam, replaces the non-Muslim ruler, 
Demirtas Khan.  In the scene where Eredna meets with Pervane, outside of 
Bursa, remarks about Demirtas Khan and says “Demirtas is no more with 
us.  In Egypt, we had him delivered to the Caliph and they quartered him.  I 
am the governor of Rome now”135.  Similarly, Kosem Mihal, originally 
Michael, leaves Greek Orthodoxy to be able to reign within the new Islamic 
state governance136.  Islamization also brought the tensions in defining roles 
for men and women. 
3-1-2 Appropriating the Minorities – Women and Shamans: 
Definition of men and images of women can best be described in the 
contrast of Pervane’s Islamic order and Ayse Hatun’s Sisterhood (Bacilar) 
norms for both sexes.  In this dichotomy, Pervane, the new financial 
minister for the Ottoman Fiefdom, represents the new order of patriarchal 
Islam and Turks, while Ayse Hatun symbolizes the order for Greek 
Orthodoxy.  They differ in their views of women in public and private 
spaces.  Pervane, while conversing with Kosem Mihal, claims that politics is 
an unpleasant environment.  Women need to reproduce and stay away from 
politics.  They should be contained in more pleasant environments, where 
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they can serve their domestic services137.  Similarly, Pervane is astounded 
with Sisters protecting the city, while Orhan Ghazi, the new Ottoman ruler, 
is away on crusade138.  This worldview parallels with that of the 
bourgeoisie, as Mosse explains that men retain power to be in the political 
scene, while women are expected to uphold chastity and honor139.  In 
contrast to this view, Ayse Hatun preserves an alternative space for women. 
Ayse Hatun is a character of resistance to the new order.  She, like 
others in the film, disguises under Islam to preserve her earlier beliefs in 
Greek Orthodoxy.  She criticizes her father’s attitude towards conversion 
into Islam, and resists against converting a church into a mosque.  
Furthermore, she also maintains manly values like horseback riding and 
protecting the city140.  Similarly, Nilufer Hatun, Ayse’s older sister, is 
portrayed as having an authority in the state’s governance.  Her 
acknowledgement of Pervane as the new financial minister is expected in 
order for his initiation141.  However, eventually, Sisterhood falls under the 
order of Islamic patriarchy.  As the contrast between Ayse Hatun and 
Pervane reveal the challenging elements of Sisterhood to be absorbed by 
Islam, Shamans are another category that the religion needs to appropriate. 
 Shamans are the ignorant, uncivilized people, who need to come 
under the order of Islam.  Imam’s exclamation of Turkomen as ‘ignorant’ 
illustrates the point.  Hacivat Karagöz paints an Islam that does not only 
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contain spiritual registers, but also economic and scientific.  Karagöz and 
his mother seek to settle down in an urban environment.  Karagöz shows his 
frustration at the nomadic lifestyle in Anatolia throughout the film.  
Consequently, they come to Bursa to become part of the city life.  However, 
urbanization also brings along many ‘modernizing’ processes, where Islam 
comes into place.  Karagöz, to be able to survive in an urban setting, needs a 
job.  Yet, he can only be economically better off if he converts to Islam.  
This way, new job opportunities will be available to him, along with 
reduced tax levies.  He also shows ambition in learning counting numbers 
and becoming literate.  Karagöz needs to acquire scientific knowledge to be 
able to live in urban Bursa.  In this way, through Islam, he can be 
modernized from an ‘ignorant Turkomen’ into a civil Muslim.  In that sense, 
the processes of urbanization that the nomadic Turkomen go through 
resembles the intertwined structure of European nation-state formation in 
nineteenth century and urbanization142.  Islam serves as an agent of 
nationalization as it absorbs Turkomen through urbanization.  As Islam has 
economical and scientific registers, it also has spiritual one for Shamans. 
 Hacivat Karagöz shows Islam’s absorption of Shaman religion.  
Karagöz’s contemplations on converting into Islam religion is a clear 
manifestation of this fact.  However, the most striking scene in illustrating 
the point is when Karagöz’s mother gets buried under minaret’s cement.  
While she goes into a Shamanist trance, frustrated by her jinn not showing 
up, falls asleep by the minaret of the new mosque, which is still being built.  
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Pervane’s men, sabotaging Hacivat and Karagöz’s construction plans for the 
mosque, let the unhardened cement flow out of the minaret’s structure over 
Shaman woman.  Minaret’s cement engulfs and completely buries her body 
under the hardened cement143.  This scene is a symbolic illustration Islam’s 
engulfing of both Shaman religion and women.  Islam in all means contains 
the nomadic Turkomen into the new Turkish Islamic order. 
3-1-3 Sacrificing for the State 
 Hacivat Karagöz is a filmic depiction of ironic sacrifices made for 
the Ottoman state.  Sisters fight for the pinnacle of the new mosque’s 
minaret.  They put their service into use for an ideology that will bring their 
end soon.  Shaman secret of converting water into stone is exploited to build 
a minaret, which will come to engulf the Shaman woman.  Although 
Shamans and Sisters served the state in different ways, they came to be 
disparaged out of the new state order.  Their sacrifices helped Ottoman 
Islamic rule to construct itself.  However, there had been spaces to challenge 
the authority as well. 
 Hacivat and Karagöz’s theatrical performance provided a medium to 
challenge the Ottoman authority.  As they conducted plays, mixed with 
fictive and non-fictive elements, their performance was able to criticize the 
rule, as long as they did not pose a clear threat.  To put it differently, 
Ottoman power was able to sustain its rule through defeating its anti-image.  
It needed a threat to pull all its forces together and define itself vis-à-vis 
what it is not.  Baudrillard explains power’s strategy as the following: 
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“Everything is metamorphosed into its inverse in order to be 
perpetuated in its purged form. Every form of power, every situation 
speaks of itself by denial, in order to attempt to escape, by 
simulation of death, its real agony. Power can stage its own murder 
to rediscover a glimmer of existence and legitimacy.”144 
Following Baudrillard’s argument, Ottoman power needed its negative 
form, its antithesis. Thus, through letting Hacivat and Karagöz’s 
performance flourish, it created its inverse, which needed to be silenced for 
the order’s perpetuation.  Hacivat and Karagöz’s execution strengthens the 
Ottoman rule. 
Minorities of women, Greeks and Shamans put their service in the 
building of the Ottoman state.  They not only provided inverted images for 
the Ottoman rule, they also ironically sacrificed themselves to perpetuate its 
system.  Eventually, as depicted in the film, Sisterhood, women, Greek 
Orthodoxy and Shaman religion were assimilated into the Islamic 
patriarchy.  Ottoman state was formed over Islam’s agency.  Islam’s legacy 
in Ottoman state puts certain institutions in place for the Early Republican 
Turkish nationalism to pick them up and act upon them. 
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3-2 Borrowing the Bride: Turkish Nation-State Formation in the Early 
Republican Era 
“Our happiness with your mother depends on my borrowed bride” 
says the Mayor to his son Ali in the film Borrowed Bride (Eğreti Gelin)145.  
Borrowed brides are sexual trainers for young men when they have reached 
the age of marriage.  As depicted in the film, the practice of borrowed bride, 
not necessarily its institution, lasted until the early days of the Turkish 
Republic146.  This practice has a vehicular importance for the Turkish 
nationalization project in its capacity to instill manliness into men.  
Nevertheless, as a traditionalist, pre-modern and pre-Republican practice, it 
cannot also be housed within the growing nationalism.  In this sense, this 
case study will serve the function of exploring the link between sexuality 
and the nation-state, which is very limited147.  The existing literature mainly 
refers to the European case.  In that respect, surveying Turkish nationalism 
and the ways in which it contains sexuality will help to investigate that link 
to a non-Western context. 
In its depiction of control over sexuality and the position of 
minorities, the film Borrowed Bride illustrates parallels with Hacivat 
Karagöz.  Akay’s film portrays the story of women, Shamans and 
Orthodoxy in the face of Anatolia’s Islamization.  As discussed in the 
previous section, Sisterhood, Shaman women with charismatic powers and 
the Turkomen are all appropriated in the new Ottoman Islamist discourse.  
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Similarly, fast-forwarding six centuries, this time Yilmaz presents the 
audience of the story of an impossible love relationship of a bourgeois son 
and a borrowed bride, in the era of early Turkish nationalization process.  
As depicted in the film Borrowed Bride, Turkish nationalization and its 
containment of sexuality retains the main three pillars of bourgeois 
respectability- ideals of men, images of women and the definition of the 
deviant, upon which the European model is formulated, while it also 
deploys away non-national and non-heteronormative practices from its 
discourse. 
 Nationalism is a modern project that constantly gets re-defined 
throughout time.  In that sense, the film Borrowed Bride, would only 
account for a particular moment in this process, the early Republican era.  
The film is set in a Western Anatolian town, during the Alphabet 
Revolution, around 1928, just 5 years after the proclamation of the Turkish 
Republic.  Ali is the Mayor’s son and is 18 years old.  He is expected to 
marry his father’s business partner’s daughter, Nese.  However, he does not 
act like a man and plays with his dolls and secretly acts in a traveling theater 
company, run by Tavit, an Armenian Turk.  His mother thinks the remedy is 
to hire a borrowed bride, who will make him ready for the marriage.  Emine, 
the borrowed bride, is a poor woman, living at subsistence level while 
looking after her younger sister, as she waits for her fiancé to get out of jail.  
Although she hesitates to accept the offer, she is later convinced as her 
economical condition is unbearable.  As she trains Ali, mainly through 
Islamic verses, they both unexpectedly fall in love and try to find a way out 
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of this situation and be together148.  However, a marriage of a bourgeois 
man with a borrowed bride is unacceptable and therefore impossible in the 
early years of the Turkish nation. 
The play of the two roosters, one modernist, one religious, outlines 
the Kemalist vein of secularism.  After the modern rooster salutes the 
crowd, the religious one enters to the stage and accuses the crowed of being 
sinful because men and women intermingle together and the women do not 
wear veils.  The modern rooster’s response to him further accounts for this 
era’s ideology, in that the people are enlightened149.  These three elements; 
gender equality, unveiling of women and the enlightenment of the people 
are the three main pillars of the new nation.  The Turkish nation-state was 
founded on this tension between the binaries of modern anti-religious 
secular Republicanism and religious backward monarchy150.  In that regard, 
in its heavy emphasis on secularism and science, it mirrors the European 
model of nation-state formulation.  Although European nationalism rests 
upon the bourgeoisie’s conceptions, it is not easy to extrapolate a similar 
concept to the Turkish nation-state context.  Since the Turkish bourgeois of 
the early Republican era and the European bourgeoisie of the 19th century 
are not completely commensurable, it is safer to figure the Turkish 
bourgeois man, as an ‘intended’ one, an economical class that intends to be 
its European counterpart.  Nevertheless, the intended Turkish bourgeoisie is 
the elite bureaucratic class, defining sexual norms for the entire nation. 
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 Turkish nationalism modernizes the gender categories.  In the 
process, it brings a rigidly defined categorization system for men and 
women, which inversely define each other.  Nonetheless, it is a definition 
process that sexually and politically subjugates women.  They need to be 
housed in private sphere and not trespass into the public, further delimiting 
the boundaries between genders.  Iffet Hanim’s case in her exertion of 
power from the private is illustrative.  Bourgeois men also define the 
deviant category.  As Turkish nationalism emphasizes Islamic religion as a 
unitary bond between its ethnically diverse constituents, non-Muslims’ 
nationality is put into question.  In that sense, Tavit, a non-Muslim Turkish 
national, provides spaces of escape for non-heteronormative and non-
national arrangements.  Nevertheless, Tavit and his space need to be shipped 
away from the nationalist discourse.  Thus, whatever left of Ottoman 
cosmopolitanism can be further squeezed into a narrower definition of 
identity, along with non-national relationships. 
3-2-1 Defining Men and Women 
 As George Mosse explores, nationalism contains sexuality through 
bourgeois respectability, in that men, women and the deviants have certain 
images and definitions151.  In these ideals, the European image of man 
overlaps with the Turkish image of national man.  Benedict Anderson notes 
that the Nation is a comradeship of men; they form fraternity bonds152.  The 
film shows many accounts of this phenomenon in Ali’s daily interactions 
with his male friends.  He goes to an all-boys school; he drinks with his 
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male friends and his friends try to take him to brothels153.  Through this all-
male environment, Ali is supposed to be cultivated to become a man.  This 
fraternity, however, creates men’s sexual subordination of women for 
political gains154.  Masculinity comes from “doing” women, it is a sexual 
act.  One of Ali’s friends mentions of an 18-year-old girl, who just came to 
the town brothel and all the men have lined up to do her.  In the same vein, 
although borrowed brides serve an important function of training boys to 
make men out of sissies, they are degraded to prostitution and are seen as 
whores, who should only be used for sexual practical training, and nothing 
else.  In the film, Iffet Hanim listens to Ali’s bedroom door during night, to 
make sure that he is able to satisfy her and actually have sex.  This ‘doing’ 
of  a woman is so crucial that Iffet Hanim cannot restrain from making the 
following remark to his Mayor husband about their son’s sexual ability: 
“You couldn’t do anything the first fifteen days.  My lion son did that slot in 
the first night”155.  Although, borrowed brides serve an important function, 
they cannot be anything more than an outcast. 
Borrowed brides do not figure as a model for the new Republican, 
modern and national Turkish woman but configures modern men and 
women via their vehicular function.  Borrowed brides, as outmoded 
practices, serve as mirror opposites for the modern nationals.  Nevertheless, 
they are tools in creation of manly men and womanly women.  Through 
providing pre-marital sexual training, Emine is responsible to instill 
manliness into Ali, while preserving his future wife’s chaste and virginity.  
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Nevertheless, since this practice is not representative for the new national 
order, it needs to be shipped away, with Tavit’s theater, letting men’s norms 
reign in the new national discourse. 
 The division of the public and private spaces, and men’s and 
women’s housing of these spaces respectively, is instructive in explaining 
the ways in which categories of men and women are elaborated.  Men, 
having political power, reign in the public.  On the other hand, women are 
expected to uphold chastity and honor and should be closed away in 
private156.  The ways in which the “borrowed bride” and Ali interact 
manifest this hierarchical arrangement.  Ali, as a man, possessing 
productivity and resourcefulness, carves out templates for his father’s textile 
workshop.  In the same space, Emine, on the other hand is depicted as 
knitting and again later trying to entertain Ali by playing a form of string 
instrument157.  Therefore, women provide service in nationalism through 
their oppositional definition vis-à-vis the men. 
 Women, as contrasted to men, provide services of chastity and 
modesty in their private spheres.  Nationality for women only comes 
through their marriage with a man158.  Emine hopes for her sister to get 
married with a decent man because she has potential.  She is pretty and she 
is picking up the new alphabet very fast159.  She is becoming a modern 
woman, and she needs to get married to gain her national subjectivity.  
Nationalism creates certain female images to uphold these ideals. 
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 Images of Britannia, Marianne and Germania are idealized forms of 
females for the British, French and German cases, respectively.  For the 
German case, Queen Luise of Prussia served as the image of ideal woman as 
she preserved traditional values, but was very careful in not trespassing into 
the men’s world, further defining the division between two genders160.  
Queen Luise’s image is also important to illustrate the ways in which 
through the figure of Iffet Hanim, as a mother, Turkish women in some 
ways parallel this image, and in others configure it. 
 Iffet Hanim, as a modern woman of the new Republic, clearly 
delineates the lines between the genders.  She is almost always depicted in 
the private sphere and she works her powers out to preserve the manly 
ideals of the society.  Although she in this sense mimics Queen Luise, her 
active usage of her sexuality and her control over her son’s sexuality 
diverges her from the Queen of Prussia.  She is the guarantor of her son’s 
masculinity.  She comes up with the idea of hiring a borrowed bride and she 
is the one who spies on his son’s sexual experience with Emine.  Iffet 
Hanim ensures that Ali is capable of having sex with women and is not 
nervous about the encounter.  Iffet Hanim also makes use of her sexuality in 
convincing the Mayor to allow a borrowed bride to come home, who at first 
opposes the idea, as it would not be appropriate to practice such outdated 
institutions in a Republican house161.  Borrowed brides also have a similar 
function, but a vehicular one, in the nation-state.  They are tools to make 
sure that men behave like men.  Furthermore, they also preserve the chastity 
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of other women- the modern women, who are supposed to preserve their 
virginity for their husbands.  They do so by providing extra-marital 
experience-related sexual service.  Emine, in her encounter with Nese, Ali’s 
fiancé, paraphrases Mohammed’s hadith: “Our prophet says that a good 
woman is the one who makes you happy when you look at her, obeys you 
when ordered, and preserves her chastity and property on her [husband’s] 
behalf”162.  Women’s sexual activity in the Turkish context rests heavily on 
the fact that Islam within the heterosexual marriage acknowledges women’s 
sexual desires.  Women are supposed to have sexual pleasure during 
intercourses163.  At this point, Turkish women depart from European ones in 
their active use of their sexuality for the nation.  Emine, again as a tutor for 
Ali, makes the following statement about women: “Some herbs give out 
odor when they are touched.  Women are like these herbs.  They need to be 
caressed and touched in order to release their odors”164.  No matter how 
active the borrowed brides in their usage of sexuality, they still cannot 
escape the stigma of being an outsider. 
3-2-2 Sacrificing Deviant Minorities 
The Turkish nationalism model, like the European one, rests heavily 
on the definition of the outsider, or the deviant165.  Men set the rate of 
normalcy which contrasts with women and non-heterosexuality.  Ali’s 
family’s, primarily his mother’s, attitude towards his non-manliness and him 
acting as a sissy raise concerns.  Ali must be contained within the 
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heteronormative marital norms.  He must not confuse rigid gender 
categories by playing with dolls at the age of 18; he must not be deviant.  
The formulation of deviance also has a racial component to it.  For instance, 
Jews provided the Other for the Germans166.  Similarly, not so much of the 
race, but religion is an important agent in the nationalism process in 
Turkey167.  Islam serves as a reference point for the definition of who is a 
Turkish national and who is not.  At this point, non-Muslim Turks’ 
nationality becomes problematic.  Tavit, the Armenian Turkish owner of the 
traveling theater, illustrates the point. 
In its relation to representing the opposite for the project of 
nationalism, Tavit and his theater company, reflect on the modernist 
national identities.  As being an Armenian Turk, a non-Muslim, he 
symbolizes the last crumbles of Ottoman cosmopolitanism.  As Turkish 
nationalism uses Islam as a way to unit its subjects, Tavit’s nationality 
becomes problematic.  Thus, his theatrical space serves an important 
function in the form of an escape for the non-national subjects.  He provides 
alternative spaces for the outcasts- the bohemians and the extravagant 
people, and also for the love of Ali and Emine, which cannot survive within 
the normal society.  Their non-aligned arrangement can be legitimate in this 
non-national space.  In one scene, Tavit acts as an engagement servant and 
symbolically weds Ali and Emine.  He says to Emine, that “I hope your 
nubility stays permanent”.  This expression sharply contrasts with Ali’s 
father’s wishes about her, when he first meets her: “I hope your nubility 
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comes and goes fast”168.  Only someone like Tavit can legitimize their 
marriage, and only someone like the Mayor can de-legitimize their love.  
However, Emine, as a borrowed bride cannot escape the destiny of being a 
prostitute and the stigmas associated with it. 
 A borrowed bride, although perceived as a prostitute, has a different 
status because she is an outsider within; she is a prostitute who comes to the 
private.  She is in no way disparate from a prostitute.  She provides her body 
and her sexuality for the maintaining of ideals of man.  Her mother gets 
angry at Ali when he gives flowers to Emine.  Iffet Hanim makes it clear 
that “She should not be given flowers.  She should only be slept with”169.  
Similarly, when Ali tries to ask for permission from his father to get married 
with Emine, his answer is straight: “What do you call a woman who sleeps 
with other men: a whore”170.  However, she is also not a prostitute because 
firstly she comes into the house and secondly she gets to be a borrowed 
bride through some form of conjugal arrangement.  In that sense, she 
becomes to be an outsider within.  That is why Ali and Emine’s arrangement 
is made legitimate by solemnization through Islam.  Borrowed bride 
practice is not representative of the new modern Turkish women.  Yet, its 
practice makes possible virile men and chaste women.  Thus, they are not 
the face but the agents for modernization, as depicted in the film. 
 Emine challenges the heternormative nature of the new national man 
by domesticating Ali and making him fall in love with her.  Therefore, their 
affair threatens the nation and cannot survive in the national space.  Ali and 
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Emine’s relationship is absolutely unacceptable as it is conceived as a free 
love between a bourgeois son and a pre-modern borrowed bride.  
Furthermore, the film shows instances for Ali’s domestication.  Emine 
domesticates Ali, therefore undermines his virility.  For example, Ali helps 
Emine with her knitting, as she explains that a wife expects her husband to 
be helpful with her light chores.  As the film illustrates, in its non-virility, 
men’s domestication is contained in the borrowed bride’s private space.  
Therefore, their free love cannot go outside and have a voice in the public.  
Thus, Ali and Emine’s affair either need to be wiped out or shipped away.  
In either case, such a non-national love needs to be annihilated. 
 As depicted in the film Borrowed Bride, Turkish nationalism mirrors 
the swallowing reflex of Anatolia’s Islamization in Hacivat Karagöz.  Just 
like the Orthodoxy, women, Shamans and Turkomen are digested within an 
emerging Ottoman Islamist order; Turkish nationalism swallows Tavit and 
his space, along with Ali and Emine’s affair, since they are 
incommensurable with the new order.  Tavit’s theater company, at this 
point, is a space of escape for the two, but nevertheless need to be sent 
away, along with their love.  As discussed above, since Tavit is a non-
Muslim, he represents what is left of Ottoman cosmopolitanism.  In this 
vein, his nationality is problematic and thus his theatrical space is the only 
place where non-aligned arrangements can flourish, like Ali and Emine’s 
affair.  Nonetheless, Turkish nationalism, with its imposition of a whole 
universe of unitary sexual and religious identities, leaves no room for non-
national relationships and spaces.  At the end, as illustrated in the film, the 
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theater company with Ali and Emine needs to leave the city.  With the 
nationalism’s reign, the three pillars of bourgeois respectability- the ideals 
of man, the images of woman, and the deviants, define the ways in which 
nation-states contain the body.  As an addition to this formulation, drawing 
from these three elements is the place of the family within the nation. 
3-2-3 Turkish Bourgeois Morality 
 Bourgeoisie class dictates its morals to the rest of the nation.  Mayor 
and his family are depicted as belonging to this group.  They go pick-
nicking by the river and follow European fashion. The Mayor also draws 
Ali’s attention to the needs of the Republic.  Turkish nation needs 
enlightened young people like Ali and Nese.  He plans of sending them to 
Germany, where Ali can study engineering and Nese can pick up the 
language171.  This attitude, again, shows the ways in which men are 
accommodated into more industrious tasks, whereas women are expected to 
have non-economic endeavors.  As Weeks points out, the formation of the 
nation-state and its structuring of sexuality are a story that cannot be told 
without reference to the economical changes in Europe172.  As for the 
Turkish nationalism, its history also coincides with heavy modernization 
and industrialization.  The Mayor’s plans of turning his textile workshop 
into a factory and doing so by appealing to German engineering is clear 
manifestation of this process173.  In other words, putting Weeks and 
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Foucault together, Ali’s family’s pre-occupation with his sexuality matches 
with the time of rising nationalism, modernization and industrialization. 
 Turkish nationalism and its pre-occupation with sexuality mirror in 
many ways the European model.  As outlined by Mosse, bourgeoisie with 
their increasing restlessness as an economical class took the initiative to 
define sexuality with respects to men, women and the deviant, for their well-
being174.  This in turn was adapted for the non-Western contexts like that of 
the Turkish nation in its early ages.  In many ways, Turkish nation captures 
rigid definitions of the gender categories.  Nation as a comradeship of men, 
a form of fraternity, holds true.  Men’s subordination of women is again a 
reflection of the principles of bourgeois respectability.  In that sense, men 
reign over women in the Turkish state. 
 Similarly, the main function of women as the oppositional definer of 
men is preserved for the Turkish nationalism.  Women serve as a category to 
create men.  Their submission into the private sphere further delimits the 
binary and puts the two genders in appropriate spaces175.  Although this 
feature is sustained for the Turkish case, the ways in which it is manifested 
diverges from the European framework.  Turkish women actively engage 
into the nation-state formation process through their upbringings of sons, 
just like European women.  What is interesting about the former is that, they 
assume this agency through control of sexuality.  Mothers watch over their 
sons’ sexuality; borrowed brides are used to ensure that boys turn into men.  
They actively use sex for the nation-state project.  Although this fact does 
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not emancipate them from men’s oppression, they have a say about their and 
men’s sexualities. 
 The other oppositional definer of men, the deviants, is also present.  
Men are not supposed to confuse gender categories.  A womanly man can be 
alarming for a bourgeois family.  Every subject is expected to appeal to 
heteronormativity.  Furthermore, the deviance for the European case also 
has a racial component, where those belonging to a certain race group are 
cast into the outsider category.  As for the Turkish case, religion serves this 
purpose.  The insiders and outsiders are defined over the axis of Muslims 
and non-Muslims.  However, non-Muslims provide spaces for alternative 
arrangements.  Non-normative subjectivities find a place within this non-
national space.  Nevertheless, they are assimilated within the nationalist 
order. 
 Last but not least, bourgeois family is essential for the nation.  
Foucault accounts to this fact as he claims that nations started to view 
families as economically important and felt the need to regulate them176.  
Through these modern families, nation-state reproduces itself. 
 The Turkish nation-state projected in the early Republican era 
captures the three main features of bourgeois respectability, the man, the 
woman and the deviant.  In its imposition of a unitary universe, Turkish 
nationalism narrows the space for non-heteronormative arrangements.  
Thus, the theater company, as it represents the Ottoman cosmopolitanism 
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and can accommodate such love affairs, is sent away to leave the scene for a 
male-reigned nationalism. 
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Chapter 4: Conclusion 
 Turkish state-formation processes as they are represented in Hacivat 
Karagöz and Eğreti Gelin are based on the sacrifices of the national Others.  
In the adventures of Hacivat and Karagöz in Bursa in 1330, the rise of Islam 
on the Anatolian territories contains its anti-image in its rule.  The old ruling 
religion of Greek Orthodoxy is converted into Islam, while Shamans settling 
in Islamic urban settings, give up of their nomadic lives.  Similarly, 
women’s role within the old rule is appropriated into the Islamic Ottoman 
order.  The new form of male domination pervades the society.  The 
sisterhood needs to be abolished, women must be contained in the private 
space in order to maintain man’s Islamic rule.  Similarly, minorities in the 
newly formed Turkish nation also sacrifice their sexuality for the new order 
of nation-state. 
 Eğreti Gelin illustrates the ways in which the new Turkish nation 
contains sexuality through sustaining bourgeois respectability, while at the 
same time annihilating non-national arrangements.  Ali cannot confuse the 
gender categories of the new modern order.  Therefore, he must retain the 
image of a man.  Emine delivers her body to train him sexually; such that he 
is virile and his future wife Nese is a virgin.  Men are also defined in 
oppositional ways via women.  This binary is elaborated by their respective 
housing of the public and the private spheres.  Thus, women work their 
powers out from the private in order to make sure their sons are men, not 
sissies.  Furthermore, as men define the norm for the society, they also 
define the abnormal, the deviants.  Since Turkish nationalism emphasizes 
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Islam as a unifying character for its diverse constituents, non-Muslims, like 
Tavit, are questioned about their nationality.  Nevertheless, as illustrated by 
the film, his theater provides room for the non-national affairs.  In this case, 
since Ali and Emine’s affair challenges national foundations of 
heteronormativity, they find refuge in Tavit’s company.  On the other hand, 
Tavit and the two lovers need to be sent away and leave the city to a male 
dominated nationalist discourse.  Just like Islam swallows the Orthodoxy, 
Shamans and the Turkomen in Hacivat Karagöz, non-Muslims and non-
heteronormatives are digested within Turkish nationalism. 
 Contemporary Turkish films provide platforms to study the 
relationship between nationalism and sexuality.  As they represent the 
psyche of a society, these films depict the ways in which minorities are 
sexually contained within the new national order.  Heteronormative male 
rule dominates the discourse both in the imperial and national Turkey. 
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